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WHAT'S RIGHT WITH AGENCY AND, INCIDENTALLY,
PARTNERSHIP?
Michael L. Richmond*
Some forty years ago, the course in Agency thrived in American law schools. In many instances Agency formed an integral part
of the first-year curriculum, and, at the very least, upperclass law
students could take it as a respected and highly significant part of
their legal training. Recognized as a course which built on and synthesized issues developed at the rudimentary levels in Torts and
Contracts, Agency served as the ideal bridge between the fundamental skills acquired in the first-year curriculum and the advanced
concepts explored in the upper classes.'
With the realization that for many law students Agency provided the first true exposure to the world of business and finance,
law schools accepted the concept of a course which combined the
developmental aspects of the traditional Agency course with an introduction to other aspects of basic business relationships. Thus
evolved a course combining the advanced theory of the Agency
course with the fundamental subject matter of a course introducing
law students to business enterprises. 2 Minimally, this course covered the advanced elements of agency law and the application of
that theory in the field of partnership law. Other aspects covered in
one course or another included rudimentary discussions of workers'
compensation, franchising and licensing arrangements, and the employer-employee relationship. Despite the shift to include these
other doctrinal considerations, the course (variously denominated
Agency & Partnership, Basic Business Organizations, or some similar permutation of the underlying theme) continued to occupy a
prominent place in the curriculum. The same rationale justifying
the course as appropriate for first-year students continued to be true,
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Law Center. J.D. Duke University, M.S.L.S. Uni-

versity of North Carolina, A.B. Hamilton College. The author would like to thank Dean
Gail Richmond, Professor J. Dennis Hynes, and Ms. Robin Hornstein for their attention to
the manuscript.
1. Conard, What's Wrong with Agency?, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540 (1949). See also Steffen, What Now, About Agency?, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 26 (1952).

2. See Steffen, supra note 1.
3. Consider the contents of the agency casebooks, infra note 13, as well as W. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (1964) and W. SELL, AGENCY (1975).
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now bolstered by the additional consideration that the information
transmitted provided a building block for the remaining courses
comprising the business curriculum of a law school.
Thirty years ago, a flurry of articles in the JournalofLegal Education discussed this transformation of the course, debating its validity and considering the proper mode for presentation of the
subject matter.' Yet despite the robust debate exemplified in these
articles, Professor Steffen sounded a note of disquiet. "It cannot be
too strongly emphasized, therefore, that although Agency has the
imprimatur of the American Law Institute, that fact, favorable as it
is, is no guarantee that Agency will always be taught in American
law schools. Leastwise, that it will always be taught as a separate
course." 5 Something in the wind, perhaps, brought notice that the
time when the only battles to be fought on behalf of the course were
between the conflicting camps of the "purists" and the business advocates might soon reach a troubled and inglorious end. Unfortunately, Professor Steffen's prophecy has proved to be only too true.
Today, of one hundred and four law schools responding to a
recent survey only forty-six reported offering a course in Agency
and Partnership as a combined offering. 6 Of these, only three re-

quired that students take the course in their first year. Two other
schools still offered a separate course in Agency, while six others
combined the subject matter either with Workers' Compensation or
in a course entitled "Enterprise Organizations." This compared to
approximately one hundred forty adoptions of case books in the
field by AALS members alone in 1949. 7
Three considerations led to this severe decrease inlaw schools
which offered the course at all, let alone required it. Those schools
responding to the survey which had either removed the course from
the first year or dropped it entirely grouped their reasons into three
major categories: (a) the material could be covered adequately in
other subjects, (b) the developing law required addition of other
subjects, or (c) the faculty or student body no longer demonstrated
interest in the course. The dates on which the schools let the course
fall by the wayside also reflect this thinking. The trend toward re4. Conard, supra note 1;Steffen, supra note 1;Mechem, What's Wrong With Agency?A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 203 (1949).
5. Steffen, supra note 1, at 27.
6. The survey, conducted by the author, appears in full as the Appendix to this article.
7. Conard, supra note 1, at 546. This comparison is not of apples and oranges. Even if
we assume that of the 140 adoptions, forty were by different professors at the same school, at
least 100 schools offered the course at that time.
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moving the course from the first-year curriculum did not truly begin
until the 1960s, gaining its greatest strength between 1971 and 1975.
Schools that dropped the course entirely began to do so about the
same time, and in the last five years this trend has gained momentum. The growth in social awareness of Americans in the late 1960s
produced a host of new course offerings to law students based on the
entry-level course in Constitutional Law.8 Continued social change
fostered by such movements as women's liberation and increased
regulation of business by federal and state agencies further heightened the trend to incorporation of new elements into the curriculum.9 Law schools added new courses and had to reject old ones;
the prime target for deletion was a course which integrated aspects
of several different subjects, the elements of which could be redistributed to those other subjects. Agency, whether in its pure or its
evolved form, was such a course. Similarly, with the rapid growth
of new areas of legal regulation, a course in such a stable area (with
a highly respected Restatement of the Law and a set of widely
adopted Uniform Acts) would not appeal to younger faculty members trained during the last fifteen years and imbued with the idealism of social consciousness and societal change.
Yet the law school community must confront significant issues
which this trend has engendered. If indeed the purpose of removal
of the course was to make room for new subjects, was this achieved
at the cost of depleting the fundamental theoretical background on
which these new courses had to rely? If the course lapsed into disrepute only because faculties felt the fundamental subject matter
could adequately be covered elsewhere, has this assumption proven
true? Finally, despite the introduction of intriguing new issues and
areas, should teachers in the business curriculum recognize an obli8. See, e.g., Ares, Legal Educationand the Problem ofthe Poor, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307
(1965); Mooney, The Media &rthe Message, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 388 (1968); Pincus, Reforming Legal Education, 53 A.B.A. J. 436 (1967); Taylor, Wealth, Poverty and Social
Change.- A Suggestionfor a Balanced Curriculum, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Dunning, Notesfor an EnvironmentalLaw Course, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
804 (1970); Irwin, The Law School and the Environment, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 278 (1972);
Wallach, Genesis of a "Women and the Law" Course: The Dawn of Consciousnessat UCLA
Law School, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309 (1972); Younger, Community Property, Women and the
Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 211 (1973).
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gation to teach the basic course? If these issues cannot be satisfactorily resolved, law schools will have done their students and faculties
a grave disservice by removing or de-emphasizing the course in
Agency.
The principal components of the course as it has evolved are
threefold: vicarious liability, authority to bind a principal, and partnership and related forms of doing business. Of schools no longer
offering the course, thirty-two claim to cover the first two areas in
the first-year courses in Torts and Contracts and forty-three say they
have included them in the Corporations course. Fifty-four schools
offer the partnership material in the Corporations course, but thirteen defer any consideration until a course in Business Planning.
Unless the courses into which these considerations have been placed
in fact deal with them, the theoretical framework is lost, and one
underlying assumption used by curricular revision committees has
no validity.
One way of assessing the degree to which the material taken
from the Agency course has been integrated in the remainder of the
curriculum is to view the extent to which these matters are covered
in the leading current casebooks in the field. The following table
analyzes the principal casebooks in Torts, Contracts, Corporations,
and Agency & Partnership by comparing the number of pages devoted to these topics to the total number of pages in each text. '0 One
significant text has been omitted from this table: Conrad, Knauss,
and Siegel, Enterprise Organization."l This casebook attempts to integrate the discussion of agency, partnership, corporations, and related business organizations into a unified whole. It will be
considered later in this article, but since only sixteen professors have
adopted it as of this writing, 12 its effect on the problem cannot be
considered to be of sufficient weight to offset the concerns raised in
the succeeding discussion.
10. Representatives of several major publishing firms kindly gave the number of adoptions for their books. Unfortunately, not all firms were as willing to furnish this information. When adoptions appear, they are approximations. Further, some publishers list
adoption by number of schools while others do so by number of professors. Thus, the
figures may not correlate precisely.
11. A. CONRAD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1977).
12. See discussion accompanying note 37.
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TABLE I
TREATMENT OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP

CONCEPTS IN LEADING CASEBOOKS
AREA

PRINCIPAL
13
AUTHOR

VICARIOUS
AUTHORITY
PARTNERLIABILITY To CONTRACT
SHIP

TOTAL ADOPPAGES TIONS

AGENCY &
PARTNERSHIP

Fessler
Henn
Hynes
Mechem
Seavey
Steffen

-055
136
127
55
211

-0108
177
267
305
173

230
187
119
-0188
230

256
378
482
546
586
852

16
19
20
NA
18
. 20

TORTS

Franklin
Green
Gregory
Henderson
Keeton
Noel
Prosser
Shapo
Shulman

26
-034
17
20
12
24
04
13

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

1176
1348
1190
996
1190
701
1261
1226
1061

29
NA
57
33
NA
NA
140
NA
10

CONTRACTS*

Freedman
Jackson
Kessler
Knapp
McGovern
Reitz

-0-0-0-0-0-0-

16
05
05
14
01
05

-0-0-0-0-0-0-

647
1320
1376
1217
397
740

NA
NA
31
16
NA
NA

CORPORATIONS

Cary
Deutsch
Frey
Hamilton
Henn
Jennings
Soderquist
Sowards
Vagts

06
-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

09
02
03
138
17
56
35
11
17

1732
984
1327
1100
1240
1156
870
830
836

70
3
32
84
34
15
NA
NA
40

The following Contracts casebooks contain no discussion of these areas: Calamari, Closen,
Dawson, Farnsworth, Fuller, Murphy, and Vernon.

13. Agency and Partnership texts: D. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION
FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT (1980); H. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1972); J. HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1974); P. MECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF

AGENCY (4th ed. 1954); W. SEAVEY, H. REUSCHLEIN & L. HALL, CASES ON AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP (1962); R. STEFFEN & T. KERR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCYPARTNERSHIP (4th ed. 1980).

Torts texts: M. FRANKLIN,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES

(2d ed. 1979); L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J.
TREECE, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1977); C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (3d ed. 1977); J. HENDERSON, JR. & R.

PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (2d ed. 1981); P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND
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With one exception, each of the casebooks in Torts contains
some discussion of vicarious liability. Thus, if the topic needs little
elaboration and a student can readily grasp the concepts, it would
seem the subject has successfully been integrated into the course in
Torts. The basic rule seems to be simplicity itself: "A master or
other principal may be liable to another whose interests have been
invaded by the tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the principal does not personally violate a duty to such other
or authorize the conduct of the agent causing the invasion."14 Unfortunately, the application of the rule leads to permutations of increasing complexity.
For example, if physical harm results from the act of the agent,
the principal will incur liability only if the agent was a servant as
well. 15 Determining whether an agent is also a servant can cause a
host of problems, because the definition of servant hinges on the
right of one to control the physical acts of another.' 6 Frequently
servants and other agents undertake the work of their principals, but
put it aside to follow their own inclinations or to do work for yet
another. Depending on the degree of abandonment of the princiMATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1977); D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS AND RELATED LAW (1980); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (6th ed. 1976); M. SHAPO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORT AND COMPENSATION LAW (1976); H. SHULMAN, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1976).
Contracts texts appearing in the table: M. FREEDMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1973); J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW OF CONTRACTS, SALES AND LEGAL METHODOLOGY (1973); F.
KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1970); C. KNAPP,
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976); W. McGOVERN, CASES,
STATUTES AND READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1980); C. REITZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AS BASIC COMMERCIAL LAW (1975).
Corporations texts: W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1980); J. DEUTSCH & J. BIANCO, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS:
WHAT CORPORATE LAWYERS Do (1976); A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, JR.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1977); R. HAMILTON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
(2d ed. 1981); H. HENN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS (1974); R.
JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1979); L.
SODERQUIST, CORPORATIONS A PROBLEM APPROACH (1979); H. SOWARDS, CORPORATION
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1978); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW:
MATERIALS-CASES-TEXT (2d ed. 1979).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 216 (1957).

15. Id. § 250. See also Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1975); South-

ern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Williams, 224 Ark. 938, 277 S.W.2d 487 (1955).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). "Right by the master to control
the conduct of the driver (servant) is the favorite approach of the courts ...... Kowaleski
v. Kowaleski, 235 Or. 454, 458, 385 P.2d 611, 613 (1963). See also Green v. Independent Oil
Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964); Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809 (1949).
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pal's business, courts may not hold the principal liable for the tortious conduct of the servant.17 Each of these variations on the basic
rule gives rise to other variations. Underlying them all is the fundamental problem that the entire concept of vicarious liability is in
opposition to the system of tort law traditionally based on the fault
of an individual. 8 The first-year student can hardly be expected to
grasp the import of the basic rule in one or two sessions of class, to
say nothing of grasping the subtle distinctions which have arisen
over the years to further complicate the field.
Exacerbating the problem, the past fifteen years have seen dramatic growth in at least two critical areas of tort law: products liability and defamation.
When published, the section [Restatement of Torts (Second)
§ 402A] reflected the law of only a few jurisdictions, but in the
twelve years following its publication it has become the basis of
strict tort recovery in the vast majority of the States.
So quickly has the law of strict tort liability developed, that
Section 402A, which only a few years ago was criticized as being
"an attack upon established legal fundamentals," is now criticized as restricting desired growth of the law in this field.' 9
In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States decided New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 20 the first of a series of cases 2 ' which, continuing through the present day, has dramatically altered the law of defamation. The course in Torts, therefore, has developed an
increasing number of new subject areas while continuing to build on
existing material. The rapid growth has caused an increase in the
quantity of material pertinent to the one course. Quite reasonably,
the settled (although complicated) area of vicarious liability receives
a decreasing amount of attention. The trend in recent years to compress the traditional six-hour course into a four or five-hour module 22 also makes it substantially less likely that the principles
17. Teaching this point proves particularly rewarding, as the instructor and the class
have the opportunity to trace a solid line of Cardozo opinions: Marks' Dependents v. Gray,
251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929); Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N.Y. 219, 137 N.E. 309 (1922); Riley

v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N.Y. 301, 132 N.E. 97 (1921); Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car
Co., 231 N.Y. 273, 131 N.E. 914 (1921).
18. Cf. J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No FAULT AND BEYOND 55
(1975).
19. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3-6 (1980).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
22. For example, the following law schools all announce in their catalogs courses in the
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supposed to have carried over into Torts from the Agency course
will be the subject of class discussion. In fact, although no formal
survey exists to prove the point, the Torts teacher who spends more
than one or two hours (if that) on the concept of vicarious liability is
rare indeed.
The same paucity of coverage of agency concepts found in
Torts holds true for Contracts as well. Sixty percent of the major
casebooks in the field omit any concentrated discussion of the material, and of the remainder only two devote more than five pages to
it. At the same time, the contractual aspects of the agency relationship pose even more difficult problems than do the tort aspects. Students cannot easily learn the complex interrelationships posed by
contracts entered by an agent for an undisclosed principal, 23 particularly when these concepts are studied without the guidance of a
professor. The many rules governing when notice to an agent will
serve as notice to a principal, and when a principal must notify third
parties of the termination of an agent, are best understood when
they are developed through case study and an historical analysis.24
The prohibition against self-dealing, so critical to later discussions
of the duties of corporate directors and officers, seems unduly harsh
to students unless it is presented in a deliberate manner as the natural evolution of a unified practice of business dealing. 25 Not only do
contracts courses fail to take these issues into account, but faculties
basic law of torts taking either four or five credit hours: Columbia University, Fordham
University, Georgetown University, Northwestern University, Stanford University,
U.C.L.A., the University of Connecticut, the University of Michigan, the University of
Pennsylvania, and the University of Wisconsin.
23. For example, while the undisclosed principal may claim the benefits of a contract at
any time, the third party still has a right to any defenses which might exist against the agent.
Robert Lawrence Assocs., Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 420 A.2d 1142 (1979). At the
same time, the agent will remain personally liable on the contract. Hodges-Ward Assocs.,
Inc. v. Ecclestone, 156 Ga. App. 59, 273 S.E.2d 872 (1980). The havoc these concepts wreak
on the basic underpinning of the law of contracts--the arm's length transaction-multiplies
a hundredfold in the mind of the uninitiated law student. Cf. Ames, UndisclosedPrincipalHis Rights and Liabilities, 18 YALE L. J. 443 (1909).

24. Consider the careful analysis employed in the following: Seavey, Notice Through an
Agent, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1916); Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 417
(1936); Seavey,,Agency Powers, 1 OKLA. L. REV. 3 (1948); Twerski, The Independent Doctrine
of Rat/ication v. The Restatement and Mr. Seavey, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1968). Indeed, the

inherent conflict between the approach of the law to the torts of an agent and the contracts
of an agent leads to even more confusion and befuddlement. "[Tihe matter of an employer's
liability for his agent's promises is really quite complicated." Mearns, Vicarious Liabilityfor
Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REV. 50 (1962).
25. Cf. Shreiber & Yoran, Allocation of Corporate Opportunities by Management, 23

L. REV. 1355 (1977), in which the authors rate three distinct lines of cases on the
very narrow issue of usurpation of corporate opportunities by management and attempt a
solution to the quagmire through a test seeking "maximalization of profits."
WAYNE
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have reduced the hours allocated to Contracts in the first year, much
as has happened with Torts. Thus, the prospects for successfully
integrating these concepts into the Contracts course of the future
seem non-existent.
Given that the courses in Torts and Contracts fail to discuss
agency concepts adequately, and given that the tendency is toward
decreasing present coverage rather than increasing it, the issue then
is whether law schools should include formal discussion of agency
concepts in their curricula. Pragmatically, if one function of law
schools is that of training practitioners, then law schools have a duty
to include discussion of agency concepts in their curricula. As Table
II indicates, bar examiners think practitioners must exhibit a sound
knowledge of the law of agency.
TABLE II
BAR EXAMINATIONS REQUIRING KNOWLEDGE
OF AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, OR
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-1980
NUMBER OF
SUBJECT

Agency and Partnership
Agency and Business
Organizations
Partnership

JURISDICTIONS REQUIRING

21
6
2

Business Organizations

generally

14

Neither Agency,
Partnership, nor Business

Organizations

8

While the inclusion of subject matter on a bar examination should
not dictate coverage of that subject matter in a law school curriculum, this factor should receive very serious consideration.26 When
26. In this Alice-in-Wonderland of legal pedagogy, the Bar examination courses
are "bread and butter," "meat and potatoes" or "realistic" courses for students to
take despite the well-known fact that but for a few spectacular individual specialists no lawyer today can make office rent from the first-year courses.
Mooney, The Media is the Message, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 388, 392-93 (1968). See also Boden,
Is Legal Education Desertingthe Bar? 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 97 (1970). But see Beytagh, Prescribed Courses as Prerequisitesfortaking Bar Examinations: Indiana's Experiment in Controlling Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 449 (1974).
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over half of the jurisdictions require Agency specifically and all except eight require knowledge of agency concepts, law schools that
neglect to teach these principles should consider whether they are
adequately preparing their students for their future careers.
in our contemporary economy virtually no transaction occurs
without an agency relationship appearing at one stage or another.27
Axiomatically, a corporation, as a fictional entity, must use an agent
when it transacts business.28 Even when a business is conducted as a
sole proprietorship, agents far more often than not represent the
business in negotiations or direct sales. Despite the advent of nofault concepts in legal treatment of vehicular accidents, 29 the question will remain whether, under agency principles, an injured person
may reach the pockets of a financially responsible individual. The
concepts developed in the Agency course thus reach the practice of
all but the most specialized practitioner, and success or failure with
a case can depend upon an issue involving the law of agency. Similarly, any discussion of advanced topics in the law school curriculum requires knowledge of the fundamental law developed in a
course in Agency.
For example, a student cannot fully grasp the rationale and the
implications of the business judgment rule3" without understanding,
first, why a corporate officer stands as an agent of the corporation
and, second, the nature of the fiduciary obligations imposed by the
agency relationship. Similarly, only the student versed in agency
concepts can appreciate the paradoxes which arise when corporations attempt to take advantage of contracts entered by their pro27. J. HYNES, supra note 13, at viii. See also H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP 2 (1979). "Agency is an indispensable tool

for the completion of the vast majority of business transactions." Twerski, upra note 24, at
14.
28. "It is elementary knowledge that a corporation in its relations to the public is represented and can act only by and through its duly authorized officers and agents." Raper v.
McCrory-McLelian Corp., 259 N.C. 199, 130 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1963).
29. Cf. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 18.

30. "Under the common law, courts are disposed to give directors a wide latitude in the
management of a corporation's affairs, so long as they reasonably exercise an honest, unbiased judgment." W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 20 (3d

ed. 1978). Thus, courts will place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove fraud or bad
faith rather than requiring the defendant director to prove reasonability or intrinsic fairness.
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d
173, 237 N.E.2d 776.(1968). But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981),
in which the Delaware Supreme Court broke with years of precedent in holding that, in
certain instances where a committee of a corporation's board of directors moves to dismiss a
shareholder's derivative actions, "[t]he Court should determine, applying its own independent
businessjudgment, whether the motion should be granted." Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
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moters.3 1 The student of negotiable instruments who has no
background in agency will have difficulty with the nuances of section 3-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code,32 while the student of
banking law must understand those agency principles which add to
the contractual relationship of banker and client. The relationship
between an attorney and a client is delineated in great part by the
fundamental concepts discussed and developed in the Agency
course.
In summary, once basic agency concepts are dropped from the
curriculum as an independent course, they are generally not included as parts of other curricular offerings. These concepts, rather
than posing simple issues, instead can demand serious and protracted thought if the student hopes to comprehend them. Finally,
agency concepts are important to the student for three reasons: they
form the doctrinal foundation for many courses to be studied later
in law school, they appear on more than eighty percent of all bar
examinations, and they appear regularly in the practice of most attorneys. At all stages of a lawyer's professional growth, he or she
must deal competently with the law of agency. Therefore, law
schools that no longer offer this subject matter should reconsider
their decisions because they may have eliminated a critical part of
their students' education.
In much the same manner, without a good understanding of
partnership law a student will have a difficult time mastering virtually any advanced course in the business or commercial curriculum.
For any planning course, the need to incorporate consideration of
partnerships can hardly be gainsaid. The establishment of businesses or real estate ventures requires careful consideration of the
advantages of conducting business in the partnership format.3 3
31.

See generally H. HENN,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
ENTERPRISES §§ 107-115 (1970); 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF

BUSINESS

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 214 (1974).

32. The authority of an agent or other representative to act, pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-403,
has been analyzed by courts according to traditional agency lines. Cf.Gate City Furniture
Co. v. Ramsey, 115 Ga. App. 753, 156 S.E.2d 221 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Achilli, 14 Il.
App. 3d 1, 301 N.E.2d 739 (1973).
33. It is assumed that by the time a student is enrolled in a planning course the
student has received some exposure to many of the areas of the law considered in
the course. ... All too frequently when a planning question is asked in a course
in a substantive area the answer is arrived at in terms of the course content, the best
tax, property, corporate, partnership, securities, etc. result.
N. STEUBEN, Preface to REAL ESTATE PLANNINrG xix-xx (1980).

Indeed, the first chapter of

Professor Steuben's text deals extensively with the choice of the appropriate business entity
in the context of a real estate transaction. Similarly, courses in business planning rely on a
knowledge of the law of Agency and Partnership. "Because of the particular tax advantages

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:251

Lack of training in partnership law will lead the advanced tax student to make such gross oversimplifications as the misstatement that
Subchapter S corporations receive the same tax treatment as
partnerships.34
The student attempting the basic course in Corporations will
find it more difficult as a consequence of not having taken a course
in Partnership. One of the most effective ways to discuss the value
of conducting business as a corporation is to compare it with conducting business as a partnership. Without a solid grounding in
partnership law, the student of corporations will not comprehend
the liability of promoters and shareholders who, for one reason or
another, find themselves liable as partners.35 The complex ordering
of priorities of payment on the termination of such a business venture which would normally be studied in partnership law must be
applied in the corporate context.36 Students would not have discussed these complex sections of the Uniform Partnership Act
before having to work with them as basic assumptions of a more
advanced course. Even more basic to the Corporations curriculum,
the student entering such a course after having taken Partnership
will have studied the Uniform Partnership Act. Aside from the additional practice gained in dealing with statutes, the student will
have dealt with a statute which conceptually parallels the Model
Business Corporations Act in one critical way: the legislation attempts to govern the external relationships of the business in all
events, but it touches the internal relationships only when the parties to the business do not themselves establish rules and regulations.3 7 Students accustomed to this bifurcated treatment find it
that flow from the partnership and trust forms of doing business, many of the tax shelter
programs have been organized as limited partnerships or, to a lesser extent, as business
trusts." Mofsky, The CorporateLaw Curriculum, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 552, 553 (1975).
34. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 204a, at 22 (2d ed. 1971).
35. See Hobbs v. Triangle Supply Co., 378 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); HENN,
supra note 31, at n.2, § 145.
36.

Compare UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40 (1914); UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNER-

SHIP ACT § 23 (1916); REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 804 (1976);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 82-84, 98 (1969).

with

37. In the corporate setting, consider the treatment by the Model Act of the requirements for a quorum of directors. "The act of the majority of directors... shall be the act of
the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 40 (1969). This same laissez-faire
attitude toward structuring of internal relationships is seen in UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 18 (1914): "The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreementbetween them, by the following rules...
"(emphasis
added). In contrast, however, neither shareholders nor partners can by their own acts alter
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easier to understand the statutes they confront in Corporations than
students who encounter the concept for the first time in that course.
Fortunately, depending on the text used in the Corporations
course, the professor has the option of including at least a brief discussion of partnership issues. Three texts 38 contain treatments of
varying lengths of partnership matters. The professor choosing any
other'text, however, must supplement it with additional materials if
the basic Agency and Partnership course has not been offered to the
students at an earlier time.
As earlier noted, one text does attempt to incorporate all elements of business organizations in one compact volume.3 9 If this
text has been adopted, arguably many of the points raised thus far
have been met. Problems do exist with this approach, however.
The text contains roughly the same number of pages of text as many
others used in the Corporations course, yet of these some forty percent are devoted to discussion of agency, partnership, and related
concepts. Thus, the discussion of corporate matters seems to be curtailed. This conclusion seems to be supported by the small number
of adoptions the text has received. As of this writing, the basic text
has been adopted by only sixteen professors. An adaptation of the
text, containing the first 603 pages (which deal primarily with
agency and partnership matters) has, however, been adopted by
twenty-six professors. This would indicate that although the quality
of the presentation in both texts has been well-received, professors
think a more complete treatment of corporate law is required. Further, attempting to treat both agency and partnership as component
parts of the Corporations course cannot be adequately managed in
the time span allocated to that course. Considering that inclusion of
elements of securities regulation, itself a rapidly growing area, has
become the usual practice in the Corporations course, 4° and considering the rapid growth of the law governing such traditional corporate areas as shareholders' derivative actions,4 ' the time required for
a discussion of the more basic agency and partnership concepts
those relationships with outsiders which have been fixed by the statute. See, e.g.,

MODEL

BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 113 (1969); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 11 (1914).
38. R. HAMILTON; R. JENNINGS; AND L. SODERQUIST, supra note 13.

39. A. CONRAD, supra note 11.

40. Folk, Recent Developments in Corporation Statutes, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 521
(1968); Mofsky, supra note 33, at 559; Thomforde, The State, CorporatePower and the Public
Interest- An Alternative to the StandardCourse in CorporationLaw, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459
(1973).
41. Cf.Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), and cases cited at 781 &
n.4 therein.
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within the format of a three or four-hour course simply does not
exist.
A PROPOSAL
Given these considerations, law schools must re-examine their
present positions. Ideally, students should have the opportunity to
take a course in basic business associations before they attempt advanced topics in corporations. This should be part of the first-year
curriculum. Perhaps too much faith is placed in the business acumen gained by students prior to their admission to law school. A
course designed to give them a basic grounding in the ways people
conduct business, placed in the first year of law school when most, if
not all, courses are mandatory, would go far toward demonstrating
that the practice of law is in no way confined to personal injury, civil
rights, and criminal litigation.
This proposal, however, probably will not succeed with curriculum planners, who have by now abandoned it as atavistic. More
acceptable, perhaps, would be the return of the basic course to the
first semester of the second year of law school, where it could serve
as a precursor to more advanced studies. The need exists for a renewed emphasis on both agency and partnership. The subject matter of these courses, which proves so necessary to advanced studies,
has now been relegated to oblivion or, at best, to minor status. Similarly, the trend toward incorporating both agency and partnership
into a single course has become a reality. To propose severing them
would be counterproductive and unfeasible given the large number
of electives to which law students should have exposure.
Thus, law schools should offer their students either a combined
six-hour course in business associations which extends through an
entire year, or a separate two-hour course in Agency and Partnership in the first semester of the second year, to be followed by a
four-hour course in Corporations in the second semester. Curriculum planners who would avoid this structure and thus eliminate any
consideration of agency or partnership from the law school experience do so misguidedly. Discussion and study of these areas is required if students are to understand the nuances (and in many
instances the fundamentals) of their other courses. A great deal is
right with both Agency and Partnership, and they should be restored to the list of curricular offerings available to students.
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APPENDIX
AGENCY

& PARTNERSHIP IN THE CONTEMPORARY LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A SURVEY

Total number of law schools responding: 104 (not all schools responded to each question).
I.

Do you presently offer a course in Agency & Partnership as a
combined offering?
YES - 46
NO - 58
A.

If so, is the course:
required, first year
optional, first year
required, upper class
optional, upper class

B.

3
2
5
38

If not, where do you cover the subject
1. AGENCY
torts & contracts courses
combined with corporations
with worker's compensation
enterprise organizations
agency
commercial paper
reading course
2.

matter?
32
43
4
2
2
1
1

PARTNERSHIP
55
combined with corporations
13
business planning
8
other
(taxation, small business associations, business
associations, enterprise organizations)

II.

Was either Agency or Partnership ever included in the first
year curriculum, if no longer taught there?
YES - 40
NO - 48
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A. What year did you remove it from the first year schedule?
2
1940-45:
9
1961-65:
1966-70:
6
1971-75:
13
1976-80:
9
B. Note why the change was made.
7
Make room for other subject(s)
4
Could be covered in other courses
4
Lack of time in 1st year curriculum
3
Faculty decision
3
To combine with corporations
1
Teacher left
1
Students didn't have enough background
1
General curriculum revision
III.

Was there ever a combined course in Agency and Partnership
or separate courses in these subjects, if no longer taught?
YES, COMBINED - 39
YES, SEPARATE

-

5

- 11
NO
A. What year did you remove it/them from the curriculum?
1956-60:
2
4
1961-65:
1966-70:
4
4
1971-75:
10
1976-80:
B. Note why the change was made.
9
Material covered in other courses
5
Material combined with corporations
5
Faculty not interested
7
Other

